Pentagon’s Drone Gamble Goes Dark

A quiet Pentagon decision to mass-produce AI “drone wingmen” could reshape American air power—and raise big questions about cost, control, and who is really in charge in the cockpit.

Story Snapshot

The Air Force picked Anduril and General Atomics to build the first production “drone wingmen” for U.S. fighters.
Contracts move from prototypes to real manufacturing, but the Pentagon is hiding the order size and total cost.
Separate contracts for the AI “brains” keep autonomy software unsettled, raising safety and control concerns.
Supporters say this delivers “affordable mass,” while critics see hype, secrecy, and new risks for U.S. pilots.

Trump-era Pentagon pushes drone wingmen into production

The United States Air Force has now awarded production contracts to defense tech startup Anduril Industries and legacy drone maker General Atomics to build its first fleet of semi-autonomous Collaborative Combat Aircraft, often called “drone wingmen.” These aircraft, designated FQ-44 for Anduril and FQ-42 for General Atomics, will fly alongside crewed fighters like the F-35 and the future Next Generation Air Dominance jet as part of a broader “drone dominance” push.^[3]

This award moves the program from a fast prototype phase into full-scale manufacturing after just a little more than two years of development.^[3] Air Force officials say the contracts cover three production lots of aircraft under what they call “Increment 1,” the first wave focused on getting combat-usable systems in the field before the end of the decade.^[1] The Trump administration has framed these drones as a way to counter rising threats while avoiding endless growth in manned fighter fleets.^[1]

How Anduril and General Atomics beat the big primes

Anduril and General Atomics did not appear out of nowhere. In April 2024, the Air Force downselected the pair from a field of five major competitors, including Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman, to keep designing and building “production-representative” test drones.^[5]^[7] That decision surprised many in the defense world because the service chose one startup and one mid-size drone specialist over three of the largest traditional defense giants.^[6]

Under those earlier awards, Anduril and General Atomics were tasked to complete detailed designs, start manufacturing, and deliver prototypes that looked close to production aircraft.^[6] The Air Force made clear at the time that this was not the final production call and that non-selected vendors could still pitch self-funded designs in later rounds.^[6] Even so, Anduril’s Fury and General Atomics’ Gambit families quickly became the leading contenders to partner with the Air Force’s future sixth-generation fighter concepts.^[2]^[9]

AI “brain” still up for grabs, raising control and safety questions

While Anduril and General Atomics won the airframe race, the software that will actually fly these drones is still in competition. The Air Force created a separate mission-autonomy track with a six-year contract vehicle for six companies: Anduril, General Atomics, Lockheed Martin, Shield AI, Northrop Grumman, and RTX Collins Aerospace.^[1] On top of that vehicle, Anduril, Shield AI, and RTX Collins received added production contracts and will now compete head-to-head to provide the final autonomy stack for the fleet.^[1]

Air Force leaders plan to review these software vendors after six months of performance and then narrow the field, with a final autonomy choice expected by summer 2027.^[1] This split model—one set of firms building the “body” and a separate contest for the “brain”—helps keep pressure on price and innovation but also confirms that core AI flight control is not yet settled. For conservatives worried about safety, accountability, and who is responsible if software fails, that ongoing experimentation is a key point to watch.^[1]

Cost secrecy and the promise of “affordable mass”

Officials and industry boosters say drone wingmen are the path to “affordable mass,” meaning large numbers of aircraft at a fraction of a fighter jet’s price.^[9] Earlier program briefings spoke about targets under roughly twenty-five million dollars per drone, with thousands planned over time to support manned fighters in high-threat airspace.^[6] Yet when the production awards were announced, the Air Force refused to disclose the cost or size of the order, leaving taxpayers in the dark about what is actually being bought and for how much.^[3]^[4]

USAF LAUNCHES DRONE WINGMEN

The U.S. Air Force selects General Atomics & Anduril to build its first Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) drone wingmen—ushering a new era of manned-unmanned teaming in air operations. 🤖✈️https://t.co/KaBxGxxFlk

— SkyGlass by AVIAR Labs (@SkyGlass12) June 18, 2026

The contracts were awarded months ahead of schedule, and officials pointed to that timing as proof that both designs met mission requirements and were ready for manufacturing.^[3] Still, without public numbers, there is no way to confirm whether the “affordable” promise holds once real production ramps up. That secrecy matters in a budget environment where Americans already feel squeezed by past overspending, inflation, and giant Pentagon programs that ran late and over cost.^[8]

What this means for pilots, warfighters, and the balance of power

Air Force leaders ultimately want at least one thousand Collaborative Combat Aircraft in the first waves to fly and fight next to U.S. pilots.^[2]^[7] In theory, these drones can carry sensors, weapons, or electronic warfare gear, letting manned jets stay farther from enemy defenses. They can also be lost in combat without risking a human life. For a Trump-era Pentagon focused on strength and deterrence, this promises more firepower in the sky without endless growth in pilot numbers or crewed-aircraft budgets.^[2]

Yet heavy reliance on software, data links, and artificial intelligence introduces new vulnerabilities. Adversaries like China and Iran are investing in jamming, hacking, and their own drone swarms, hoping to overwhelm U.S. networks.^[22] If the autonomy stack or communications fail at the wrong moment, a drone wingman could become useless—or worse, unpredictable—right when American pilots are counting on it. Careful testing, real accountability, and honest reporting will be vital so that “drone dominance” strengthens, rather than undermines, U.S. combat power and constitutional civilian control over the use of force.